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A B S T R A C T
A lock-up agreement ensures that major shareholders retain
significant economic interest in the companies following the IPOs.
Rationally, these insiders will not adhere to the lock-up agreement
unless the benefits of doing so can more than offset the costs.
Therefore, in an environment characterized by high information
asymmetry, a lock-up agreement can serve as an effective
mechanism to signal the risk or quality of firms. This article
examines whether the lock-up ratio and lock-up period affect
the initial returns, using a sample of 384 IPOs listed on Bursa
Malaysia between 2000 and 2012. The results of the cross-sectional
multiple regression show that the lock-up period is significantly
positive in explaining IPO initial returns, but the lock-up ratio is not.
The findings provide new insights for testing the signaling content
of lock-up provisions, particularly in a setting characterized by high
information asymmetry.
 2014 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.1. Introduction
For decades, the literature on initial public offerings (IPOs) has been devoted to establishing
evidence of the anomalous initial returns on the newly issued shares. The evidence has been found to
be so persistent as well as prevalent in numerous stock markets including Malaysia that IPO Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2534913 
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literature exhibits a considerable research effort devoted to finding explanations for the anomalous
behavior in the immediate IPO aftermarket. Among the theoretical models that continue to obtain the
most proponents are the adverse selection and signaling hypotheses, which are rooted in information
asymmetry. The unequal distribution and communication of information between insiders (owners
and management) and potential investors is a significant feature of the IPO firms because, prior to the
IPO, these formerly privately held firms are not required to disclose their information to the public.
Upon the exercise of an IPO, investors have the chance to reduce information frictions by paying
attention to the information provided by the issuer in the prospectus, especially information in which
disclosure is required by the market regulator.
Paradoxically, few studies concentrate on the impact of the information provided by IPO issuers
in the prospectuses on initial returns (Bhabra and Pettway, 2003), even if the topic is as important
as lock-up provision. It is undeniably reasonable to suspect that investors’ cognitive ability can be
clouded easily by the volume of information disclosed in the prospectus. In short, investors need
to be selective in deciding which information is relevant in influencing the value of the IPO.
Effective May 3, 1999, lock-up (share moratorium) has been made mandatory for certain issuers of
IPOs in Malaysia. This makes the case in the Malaysian IPO market different from those in the US
and the UK, where the lock-up arrangement is implemented on a voluntary basis based on
negotiations between the investment bank and insiders of the IPO companies (Corhay et al., 2002;
Mohan and Chen, 2001).
Lock-up provisions are in fact imposed in many other markets, including the MENA countries.
However, the average lock-up period in those markets is normally longer than the minimum
requirement (Hakim et al., 2012). In contrast, all IPO issuers in Malaysia stick to the mandatory
lock-up period imposed by the regulator, while being more concerned about the lock-up ratio, that
is, the percentage of shares that are prohibited from being sold, disposed, and/or transferred during
the lock-up period. Even though the Securities Commission (SC), the Malaysian securities market
regulator, only requires a certain minimum lock-up ratio, interestingly, most of the issuers
voluntarily agree to a higher lock-up ratio.
The present study attempts to bridge the research gap stipulated by Bhabra and Pettway (2003) by
examining the role of one aspect of the voluminous important information disclosed in issuers’
prospectuses, namely lock-up provision. Mohan and Chen (2001) and Brav and Gompers (2003),
who examine the information content of lock-up provisions in IPOs, define a lock-up provision as a
prohibition from selling, disposing, and/or transferring shares for existing shareholders within a
specific period of time after the IPO listing date. In the context of Malaysian IPOs, a lock-up provision
(legally referred to as a share moratorium) is implemented to legally restrict major shareholders (or
promoters) of the issuing firms from selling, disposing, and/or transferring all or a certain percentage
of their shares within a certain period.
The present study focuses on lock-up provision in Malaysia primarily because this important
provision has not received the deserved empirical attention (Wan-Hussin, 2005) despite the emphasis
placed upon lock-up provisions by the Securities Commission. Commencing on May 3, 1999, lock-up
provision has been made mandatory for the major shareholders of most issuing companies, and ever
since then it has undergone several amendments during the study period alone (in 2003, 2008, and
2009). The latest revisions in 2009 are apparently the most restrictive and vigilant, reflecting the
effectiveness of this provision as a mechanism for protecting investors’ interests. The fact that the
market regulator has incessantly been upgrading the lock-up provisions motivates the present study
to establish empirical evidence of the role of such market structural changes in explaining the most
puzzling phenomenon in IPOs, namely initial returns.
The present study differs from Wan-Hussin (2005) in three ways. First, Wan-Hussin (2005)
examines a period that partially includes the first few months after the introduction of the mandatory
lock-up regime for IPOs, but the regulatory change is not incorporated into his analysis. Second, unlike
Wan-Hussin (2005), who uses the ratio of directors’ shares that are locked, the present study takes the
actual number of shares locked by the major shareholders who are actually identified as promoters of
the issuing companies by the SC. Third, the present study examines lock-up provisions not only from
the lock-up ratio, but also the lock-up period dimension. Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2534913 
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the UK IPO markets, where lock-up is implemented on a voluntary basis (Espenlaub et al., 2001;
Goergen et al., 2006; Nowak, 2004), Malaysia offers a suitable setting for testing the signaling content
of a lock-up provision. Although lock-up provision is mandatory, the actual implementation still
indicates that major shareholders voluntarily commit to a higher lock-up ratio. In addition, no setting
is more suited to test the signaling hypothesis than a developing market such as Malaysia, which is
still characterized with high information asymmetry. Eldomiaty (2008) asserts that signaling becomes
more prevalent in a market of higher information asymmetry, which is more commonly associated
with developing rather than developed markets.
The remainder of this article is organized as follows. The next section provides a background of the
study by reviewing the relevant literature and describing the Policies and Guidelines of New Issues in
Malaysia. This is followed by a section which presents the methodology employed in this study and
then another which reports and discusses the results. The final section concludes and discusses the
implications of the study.
2. Background of our study
2.1. Relevant literature
Lock-up information published in IPO prospectuses conveys information about the interest and
confidence of ‘‘insiders’’ (i.e. major shareholders) in the future prospects of their companies. Arguing
along this line, information on lock-up provision should be incorporated in the market valuation of the
firm. Such a reasoning was previously put forward by Brav and Gompers (2003) and Mohan and Chen
(2001). They argue that lock-up provisions should have a certain influence on initial returns because
such provisions encompass information about the quality, commitment, moral hazards, and/or ex-
ante uncertainty of specific investments. Evidently, they find that firms with longer lock-up periods
tend to exhibit greater uncertainties in their values and, consistent with the risk-return trade-off
theory, these firms record a deeper IPO underpricing.
The moderating role of information asymmetry on the relationship between lock-up provision and
initial return is based on the results in Brau et al. (2005). The authors find that lock-up periods tend to be
shorter in cases in which the degree of asymmetric information is low. If the length of lock-up provision
can be construed as a signal of risk (Mohan and Chen, 2001), then in cases in which information
asymmetry is low, issuers will see no particular reason to convince the investors of the risks and
therefore the value of the firm. This conjecture is put forward with the assumption that better informed
investors and underwriters require the major shareholders to hold on to their shares as a form of
insurance. In other words, lock-up provisions ensure that major shareholders do not leave bad firms to
new investors to absorb the negative consequences. In effect, a lock-up agreement could minimize the
uncertainty about the IPO value and signal important information about the risk of the IPOs.
The present study expands upon the aforementioned works by examining two dimensions of
lock-up provision, length and ratio. The main argument put forth in the present study is derived from
Miller (1977), who implies that optimistic shareholders tend to hold on to stocks that promise better
future returns than the ‘‘bird-in-the-hand’’ of the return on the IPO in the immediate aftermarket.
However, if the lock-up (ratio) provision is implemented in a market of poorly informed and
excessively over-optimistic investors, such provisions impose restrictions on the supply of highly
demanded IPOs, which subsequently creates additional, but artificial, pressure on the price of the
IPOs in the immediate aftermarket.
In addition, the argument that lock-up signals risk is consistent with a recent finding by Gao and
Siddiqi (2012), which shows that firms with longer lock-up periods have bigger agency problems and
poorer long-term performance. Recently, Arthurs et al. (2009) found that firms without venture
capital backing and a reputable underwriter will use a longer lock-up period to signal quality.
Courteau (1995) and Liao et al. (2011) argue that higher quality issuers also tend to agree to a longer
lock-up period. If high quality translates to low risk, a negative relationship should prevail following
the low risk-return trade-off. A positive relationship, on the other hand, can prevail if quality triggers
demand, which will push the price up so that initial returns will be higher.
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Hwang (1989), who explain that the fraction of issuer holdings (directly implying the lock-up ratio) is
positively related to the initial return because shareholders of high quality firms tend to sell only a
small proportion of their shares to send a positive signal. Original shareholders are just being rational
if they choose to retain more of their shares in a company (when they have the option to liquidate at
the IPO), particularly if they believe that the company will increase their wealth in the future. Original
shareholders, as insiders of a firm, have the advantage of being privy to first-hand information that
may be utilized to more accurately assess the prospects of the firm. To a certain extent, retaining the
capital invested in a company that one is sure about is a less risky decision than reinvesting the capital
in other companies that the investor is less familiar with. However, Mohan and Chen (2001) argue that
the signaling content of lock-up provisions can be interpreted as either quality or risk. Since a higher
lock-up ratio signals higher quality, which can be compatibly interpreted as lower risk, the
appropriate risk-return trade-off is lower initial returns. In this respect, a negative relationship is
expected between lock-up provision (ratio and period) and initial returns. However, if the higher lock-
up ratio signals a higher risk, then the expected impact would be a higher return, where a positive
relationship is more likely to prevail.
A positive influence of lock-up provision on initial returns can still be expected in cases in which
lock-up ratios and periods are seen as signaling the firm’s quality or better future prospects (Courteau,
1995) if the provision can improve demand for an IPO. From the IPO supply and demand standpoint
(Bradley et al., 2001), when the locked-up shares are prohibited from entering the market, the
resulting restricted supply will not meet the high demand from optimistic traders (Miller, 1977).
Consequently, the shortage of quality IPOs creates upward pressure on its price and, therefore, higher
initial returns.
In the context of Malaysian IPOs, the present study concurs with Mohan and Chen (2001) and Wan-
Hussin (2005), who conclude that, since lock-up provisions are imposed on selected companies/
industries that are deemed relatively riskier, higher lock-up ratios and longer lock-up periods are
expected to signal higher risk and are therefore more likely to result in higher initial returns.
Therefore, the present study hypothesizes the following:
H1. Lock-up periods have a significant positive influence on the initial returns of IPOs.
H2. Lock-up ratios have a significant positive influence on the initial returns of IPOs.
The extant literature on the relationship between lock-up provisions and initial returns in Malaysia
is very limited. Wan-Hussin (2005), who uses the portion of directors’ shares which are locked to
estimate the lock-up ratio, finds that the lock-up ratio has a significantly positive relationship with IPO
underpricing. He explains that if the directors agree to lock up a larger proportion of shares, this
indicates greater uncertainty of the firms, and therefore investors will need to be compensated with a
deeper underpricing in order to lure them to purchase the IPOs.
2.2. Policies and guidelines on Malaysian issue/offer
The amendment of the Policies and Guidelines on Issue/Offer of Securities created on May 3, 1999,
introduced a major structural change in the Malaysian IPO market as it imposed a mandatory lock-up
provision (interchangeably share moratorium) on most IPO issues seeking listing on Bursa Malaysia
(formerly known as Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange)1. In order to understand the transitions in lock-up
arrangements that occurred as a result of the 1999 amendments, a summary of the revisions and
amendments made on the Policies and Guidelines of the SC are provided in Table 1. In the earlier
edition of the ‘‘Policies and Guidelines on Issue/Offer of Securities’’, which was published in 1995, the1 ‘‘Prior to 2009, the stock market structure in Malaysia was composed of three listing boards. The Main Board listed
companies with paid-up capital of at least RM60 million; the Second Board listed those companies with a paid-up capital of
more than RM40 million; and the MESDAQ listed companies with at least RM2 million of paid-up capital and consisted
primarily of technology companies. Since 2009, the Malaysian stock market has operated on two listing boards: the Main
market, which merged the Main and Second boards; and the Ace market, which replaced the MESDAQ’’.
Table 1
Summary on share moratorium by effective date of revisions.
Effective date Affected companies Share moratorium
3 May 1995 Main board—only companies in property
development, construction, services or
specialized activities
All second board companies
All MESDAQ companies
Will not be allowed to sell, transfer or assign
their shareholdings amounting to 45% of the
nominal issued and paid-up capital for one year
1 May 2003 Main board—only property, development or
construction companies
All second board companies
All companies applying for listing under
the market capitalization route
All IPC companies
All MESDAQ companies
Will not be allowed to sell, transfer or assign
their shareholdings amounting to 45% of the
nominal issued and paid-up capital for one year
1 February 2008 All IPC companies
All MESDAQ companies
All other listing
The promoters should not be allowed to sell,
transfer or assign their shareholdings
amounting to 45% of the nominal issued and
paid-up share capital of the applicant at the date
of admission for one year from the date of
admission
All other listing applicants, the promoters
should not be allowed to sell, transfer or assign
their entire shareholdings in the applicant at the
date of admission for six months from the date
of admission
3 August 2009 All companies applying for listing under
the profit test or market capitalization test
All IPC companies
All ACE companies
Promoters are not allowed to sell, transfer or
assign their entire shareholdings in the
applicant as at the date of listing, for six months
from the date of listing
Note: Main board—listing board for companies with paid-up capital of at least RM60 million, second board—listing board for
companies with a paid-up capital of more than RM40 million, MESDAQ—listing board for companies with at least RM2 million
of paid-up capital and consisted primarily of technology companies. Main market—listing board which was introduced in
2009 from the merge of the main and second boards. IPC—infrastructure project corporation.
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listing on the Main Board (listing avenue for bigger and stable companies) and all issuers seeking
listing on the Second Board (listing relatively smaller companies) to choose one of two options:
1. A share moratorium (lock-up provision) on the entire shareholdings of substantial shareholders
and promoters for one year upon admission, or
2. A profit guarantee of 90% of the forecasted profits as stated in the prospectus and also 90% of the
submitted annual maintainable profits for the following two financial years.
About four years later, on May 3, 1999, the SC introduced major amendments to the ‘‘Policies and
Guidelines on Issue/Offer of Securities’’. One of particular interest to the present study is the removal
of the profit guarantee option for the affected companies on the Main Board (Property Development,
Construction, Services, or Specialized Activities) and all companies on the Second Board. The SC
imposed a standard requirement of a moratorium on the disposal of shares by the promoters (major
shareholders) of these companies on their respective shareholdings amounting to 45% of the enlarged
issued and paid-up capital of the company for at least one year from the date of listing (Securities
Commission, 1999). The same moratorium applies to all Malaysian Exchange of Securities Dealing and
Quotation (MESDAQ) companies, except that their major shareholders are also required to hold at
least 51% of the nominal issued and paid-up capital upon admission to the board. The revised
Policies and Guidelines issued in March 2002 for the MESDAQ companies introduced a minor change.
After the 1-year lock-up period expires, the major shareholders are allowed to sell 1/3 of their
shareholdings instead of 20%, as specified in the 1999 version, on a straight-line basis.
Next, the revised Policies and Guidelines (Securities Commission, 2003) for the Main Board and
Second Board companies, which took effect on May 1, 2003, consisted of two main changes. First, the
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include those companies that apply for listing through market capitalization routes and all
Infrastructure Project companies (IPCs)2 regardless of the listing route. Second, while the basic details
of the moratorium remain the same as in the 1999 version (sale restriction on 45% of nominal and
paid-up capital for 1 year), the rules on the disposal of shares after the expiration of the lock-up period
were changed. The revised policies lifted the gradual share disposal upon the expiration of the lock-up
period for all affected Main Board and Second Board companies completely. The only exception is in
relation to IPCs, whose major shareholders are allowed to sell only 50% of their lock-up shares per
annum on a straight-line basis after the lock-up period expires, subject to the condition that these
companies produced one full financial year of audited operating revenue.
The Guidelines on the Offering of Equity and Equity-Linked Securities that became effective on
1 February 2008 retain the moratorium specifications for IPCs (sale restriction on 45% of nominal and
paid-up capital for at least 1 year). However, for the rest of the companies, the major shareholders are
prohibited from selling their entire shareholdings for a period of six months from the date of
admission. For MESDAQ companies, the moratorium remains the same, as stipulated in the
2002 Policies and Guidelines.
On August 3, 2009, the SC introduced several more restrictive and vigilant changes in the Policies
and Guidelines. Under the revised policies, the moratorium on the entire shareholdings and the six-
month lock-up period are imposed on all affected companies, including the IPCs and the Access,
Competitive and Efficient (ACE) Market companies (note that in 2008 the major shareholders of both
IPC and ACE companies were subject to a sale restriction of 45% of nominal and paid-up capital for
1 year). While the new blanket policy appears to be more relaxed, the following requirements reflect




(Seor the IPCs, the lifting of the 6-month lock-up period is still subject to one full financial year of
audited operating revenue. Failure to do so imposes an extended requirement on the major
shareholders to retain 45% of issued and paid-up capital for an indefinite period of time.2. For the ACE Market companies, the major shareholders are unconditionally subject to a 45%
share moratorium for another 6-month period. Thereafter, the major shareholders are allowed
to retire 1/3 per annum of the 45% shareholding on a straight line basis provided that the
companies have produced one full financial year of audited operating revenue. In other words,
45% of the major shareholders’ shares are locked indefinitely until the company produces one
full financial year of audited operating revenue (Securities Commission, 2009).
Within the time frame of this study, the latest revisions of the Policies and Guidelines were issued
on September 22, 2011, and took effect on January 3, 2012 (Bursa Malaysia, 2011). The focus of the
2011 revised Policies and Guidelines was on improving corporate disclosure without introducing any
changes to the share moratoriums.
3. Data and methodology
The primary data used in this study are those of the IPOs that sought listing on Bursa Malaysia
between January 2000 and December 2012. January 2000 was chosen as the beginning because this
study specifically examines the period when the lock-up provision (share moratorium) was already
compulsory for IPO issuers in this market. The 6-month lapse from the date of the lock-up provision
commencement until the beginning of the study period is in place to allow ample time for the
investors to realize the regulatory changes that have taken place in the listing requirement. The data
are drawn from the websites of Bursa Malaysia and the Securities Commission, annual reports of BursaCompanies whose core business is building and operating ‘‘a project which creates the basic physical structures or
ndations for the delivery of essential public goods and services that are necessary for the economic development of a state,
ritory or country, such as the construction and operation of roads, bridges, tunnels, railways, mass transit systems, seaports,
ports, water and sewage systems, sewerage systems, power plants, gas supply systems, and telecommunication systems’’
curities Commission, 2009).
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of 495 new issues during the study period. Similar to Abdul-Rahim and Yong (2008) and Yong (2007),
the present study selects IPOs that are offered as public issue, offer-for-sale, private placement, or a
hybrid of any of these forms. The present study excludes IPOs that involve special types of offers such
as restricted offer-for-sale, restricted public issue, restricted offer-for-sale to eligible employees,
restricted offer-for-sale to Bumiputra (Malays and indigenous people) investors, special and restricted
issues to Bumiputra investors, tender offers, and special issues. Abdul-Rahim and Yong (2008) and
Yong (2007) explain that these are uncommon types of issues which can be excluded to avoid less
meaningful outcomes. Furthermore, the present study excludes these special types of offers because
they are rarely undertaken, except with the offer for sale or public issue. The present study also
excludes the Real Estate Investment Trust (REITS) category due to the different presentation format of
the financial statements. Finally, IPOs with missing data and those issued by firms that are unaffected
by lock-up provisions are also excluded. These selection criteria provide a final sample of 384 IPOs,
representing 77% of the total IPOs listed between 2000 and 2012.
To assess the impact of lock-up ratios and periods on initial returns, a cross-sectional regression
model is applied in the following form:
IROPENi ¼ a þ b1LRi þ b2DLPi þ b3DPRIVi þ b4LNOFFSZi þ b5OSRi
þ b6RISKi þ b7MKTCONi þ ei
where IROPEN is initial return calculated as the difference between the IPO offer price and its opening
price on the first day of listing as a percentage of the offer price, LR is the lock-up ratio obtained from
the prospectus and verified accordingly with the firm’s ownership structure in the first annual report
published after the listing, DLP is the lock-up period dummy which takes a value of 1 for one year and
0 for six months, LNOFFSZ is the natural log of the offer price times total units offered, OSR is the
oversubscription ratio (proxy for investor demand on the new IPO), DPRIV is a dummy variable which
equals 1 for IPOs issued through private placements and 0 otherwise, RISK is calculated as the
reciprocal of the IPO offer price (Beatty and Welch, 1996; Bradley and Jordan, 2002; Su and Fleisher,
1999), and MKTCON is market condition during the listing, which is the difference in the EMAS price
indexes between listing and offer dates, as a percentage of the price index on the offer date. A
summary of the operational definitions of the variables is provided in Table 2.Table 2
Summary of operational definitions of variables.
Variables Definitions
IROPEN IROPEN ¼ POpening=POffer
 
 1  100
where POpening—opening price of the first listing day, and POffer—offer price of the IPO
LR LR ¼ LS=NOSH
where LS—number of shares locked-in by the major shareholders, and NOSH—number of shares
outstanding
DLP




DPRIV ¼ 1 private placement
0 otherwise

PRIV PRIV ¼ PP=NOSHI
where PP—number of shares issued through private placement, and NOSHI—number of shares issued at
the IPO
LNOFFSZ ln NOSHI  POFFER
 
MKTCAP MKTCAP—Pre-IPO sharesPOFFER
OSR OSR ¼ Subscribed shares=NOSHI
RISK RISK ¼ 1=POFFER





where PILISTING—price index on the listing date, and PIOFFER—price index on the offer date
Note: This study uses the EMAS (constituents of which are all shares listed on the Main board of Bursa Malaysia) as the market
index.
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examination of the hypothesized relationships in light of their significant relationships with initial
returns in earlier studies. First, assuming that investors discriminate IPOs based on firms’
characteristics, the present study hypothesizes that initial returns are lower, ceteris paribus, when
the supply of IPOs (LNOFFSZ) is greater (Abdul-Rahim and Yong, 2010; Jewartowski and Lizińska,
2012; Ghosh, 2005). Second, the present study predicts that excess demand for the IPOs (OSR) will put
additional pressure on the aftermarket price of the IPOs and, accordingly, generate higher initial
returns. For Malaysian IPOs, Abdul-Rahim and Yong (2010) find that OSR has a significantly positive
impact on initial returns. Third, institutional investor involvement in the Malaysian IPO market can be
estimated through a type of IPO issue referred to as private placement. In a study on Malaysian IPOs,
Yong (2011) finds results which indicate that the lack of institutional informed investors in IPOs is
compensated by higher initial returns, possibly to counterweigh investors’ fear of being trapped in a
winner’s curse situation. Fourth, an examination of return on investment appears to be incomplete
without examining the returns in light of their respective risks. The risk of IPOs is measured as the
reciprocal of the offer price. Bradley and Jordan (2002) argue that, because the offer price is set prior to
the IPO, the market’s influence on this price is minimal and, as such, can be a good indicator of risk.
Finally, as suggested by Ritter (1984) and Lee et al., 2011, the market condition should have a positive
impact on initial returns because prices tend to increase during a bullish market.
4. Results and discussion
4.1. Preliminary results
Table 3 presents the descriptive statistics of each variable used in the present study. The results
indicate that average initial returns are comparable with 31% for the period from 1999 to 2008
(Abdul-Rahim et al., 2012). Meanwhile, the lock-up ratio of 56% in the present study is higher than
the 20% lock-up ratio of the directors between 1999 and 2000 in the sample of 154 firms reported in
Wan-Hussin (2005). The finding suggests that the SC’s decision to enhance the equity guidelines by
imposing stricter regulations on issuers in the form of lock-up provision and better corporate
disclosure might have increased the issuers’ awareness of their accountability to the investors.
From a market perspective, greater transparency in corporate information should help improve the
evaluation and decision processes in setting IPO prices.
The average offer size of IPOs (RM149 million) in this study is more than twice as large as the
RM56.93 million reported by Abdul-Rahim et al. (2012). The huge size is most likely due to the
issuance of a few mega IPOs in 2012; Felda Global Venture Holdings Bhd, which is the world’s third
largest IPO issue, raised RM3.2 billion, and IHH Healthcare Bhd, which is Asia’s largest hospital
operator, raised RM2 billion. The average private placement issue is 21.19 million units. Meanwhile,Table 3
Descriptive statistics of the variables (N=384).
Variables Mean Min Max Std. Dev. Skewness Kurtosis
IROPEN (%) 29.44 68.13 288.89 46.45 1.77 8.23
LR (%) 56.25 24.26 83.53 8.90 .46 2.80
DLP .78 .00 1.00 .42 1.32 2.75
DPRIV .76 .00 1.00 .43 1.22 2.49
PRIV (%) 44.02 .00 96.68 33.99 .07 1.51
PRIVATE (RM mill) 21 0 550 44 8 86
LNOFFSZ 16.97 14.69 23.25 1.19 2.22 9.94
OFFSZ (RM mill) 149 2 12,500 927 10 123
OSR (times) 32.23 .89 377.96 49.23 3.33 16.91
RISK 1.69 .20 8.33 1.27 1.55 5.85
MKTCON (%) .52 20.00 18.95 4.65 .47 4.80
MKTCAP (RM mill) 459 16 40,400 2700 11 145
Notes: IROPEN (offer to open), DLP (lock-up period dummy), LR (lock-up ratio), DPRIV (dummy of private placements), LNOFFSZ
(ln(offer size)), MKTCAP (market capitalization), OSR (oversubscription ratio), PRIVATE (private placements unit), OFFSZ (total
units offeroffer price), RISK (1/offer price) and MKTCON (EMAS price index offer-to-open).
Table 4
Pearson correlations between explanatory variables (N=384).
Variables 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
IROPEN 1.00
LR .050 1.00
DLP .193*** .229*** 1.00
DPRIV .054 .040 .023 1.00
LNOFFSZ .234*** .127** .421*** .268*** 1.00
OSR .460*** .080 .109** .156*** .229*** 1.00
RISK .234*** .001 .015 .359*** .379*** .281*** 1.00
MKTCON .168*** 078 .004 .091 .006 .006 .056
Notes: *** and ** indicate significance at the 1% and 5% levels (2-tailed), respectively. Numbering in column heading correspond to
item heading in rows.
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only .52%, which partly explains the lower IPO initial returns during the study period. Still, making an
initial return of 29.44% on average from the IPO market when the rest of the stock market is down is
solid evidence to support the anomalous behavior of the IPO market.
The results of the Jarque-Bera statistics for all variables reject the null hypothesis that the data are
normally distributed. However, in studies employing financial data, such findings are quite common
due to the extreme values which result from actual stock market movements (Brooks, 2008).
In addition, a violation of such assumptions is not likely to jeopardize the reliability of the estimated
coefficients when a large sample is used, because the central limit theorem states that the sum of an
independent observation having any distribution whatsoever approaches a normal distribution as the
number observations increases (Stevens, 2009).
Table 4 presents the correlations between variables and, in general, the results indicate linear
relationships between most predictor variables (offer size, over-subscription ratio, risk, lock-up
period, and market condition during listing) and initial returns. Exceptions exist with lock-up ratio
and private placements, which seem to have no particular relationships with the initial returns of the
IPOs. As far as correlations between independent variables are concerned, the results show no
indication of a multicollinearity problem for the variables. This finding will be confirmed with the
variance inflation factor (VIF) values from the regressions.
Fig. 1 is plotted to illustrate the average initial returns and lock-up ratios in greater detail based on
annual values. The left area before the dotted vertical line shows the average of returns and lock-upFig. 1. Average initial return (IROPEN), lock-up ratio (LR), and number of IPOs issued between January 2000 and December 2012.
Table 5
Results of regressions of initial return on selected predictor variables, 2000–2012.
Variable Predicted sign IROPEN IRCLOSE
Coefficient t-Stats Coefficient t-Stats
C 72.9610 2.3266** 74.8375 1.9234**
LR Positive .1364 .6091 .0166 .0619
DLP Positive 11.5463 2.4089** 11.5486 2.0302**
DPRIV Negative 22.9196 4.4986*** 26.4015 4.0710***
LNOFFSZ Negative 3.8458 2.4174** 3.6417 2.0268**
OSR Positive .3985 4.8208*** .3133 5.1492***
RISK Positive 5.1703 2.2334** 8.5447 1.8155*
MKTCON Positive 1.8280 4.1795*** 1.6175 3.3082***
Adjusted R2 .2986 .1973
F-statistics 24.2961*** 14.4555***
Durbin–Watson 1.5953 1.7576
VIF range 1.00–1.50 1.0–2.3
RAMSEY reset test, F-stats 2.5510 2.2038
Notes: ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. Autocorrelation problems are corrected using
the Newey–West procedure. VIF—variance inflation factor. The p-value of the F-statistics from the Ramsey test is .1111.
R. Mohd Rashid et al. / Economic Systems 38 (2014) 487–501496ratios when the mandatory lock-up period is set for one year. The area to the right of the vertical line
represents the new regime when the lock-up period is revised to only six months after the IPO listings.
The separation demonstrates that the IPO market appears to have become more efficient in recent
years, since the average initial return reduces to about 19% during the 2008–2012 period. The
declining number of IPOs issued during the aforementioned period may also indicate that the IPO
market is in a cold condition. Meanwhile, the imposition of the mandatory lock-up ratio on the
promoters’ entire shareholdings increases lock-up ratios, even if only slightly.
4.2. Regression results
To statistically quantify the role of lock-up ratios and lock-up periods in explaining variations in
initial returns, the cross-sectional multiple regression analysis specified earlier is run; the results are
reported in Table 5. The estimated coefficients are obtained after correcting for autocorrelation, using
the Newey–West procedure, and for heteroskedasticity problems, using the White heteroskedasticity
test. The regression model also passes the Ramsey reset test of model specification.
Consistent with the results from the correlation test, the lock-up period plays a significantly
positive role in explaining IPO initial returns. Note that the lock-up period is presented in the form of a
dummy variable (DLP) which takes a value of 1 if the lock-up period is one year and 0 if it is six months.
In a nutshell, the positive relationship between the lock-up period and the initial return corresponds
to the hypothesis (H1) that longer lock-up periods reflect higher risk, which then leads to the need to
provide higher initial returns. The finding is also consistent with Wan-Hussin (2005) and Mohan and
Chen (2001), who suggest more stringent lock-up requirements (in terms of both length and fraction)
imposed on firms that have greater uncertainty. The finding of this study is also consistent with Brav
and Gompers (2003), who argue that insiders with greater moral hazard problems are more likely to
lock in their shares for a longer period of time. On the investors’ side, uncertainty and moral hazard
issues must be compensated accordingly with deeper underpricing. The conjecture is put forward
under the assumption that better-informed investors and underwriters require firm insiders to
hold on to their shares as a form of insurance; i.e., making sure that insiders do not leave poor
quality firms for the new investors to bear the negative consequences in the forms of negative
earnings and particularly stock price depreciation. In effect, lock-up agreements can minimize
uncertainty regarding the value of an IPO by conveying information about the risk of the IPO
companies (Huang and Lin, 2007).
Meanwhile, the hypothesized positive coefficient of the lock-up ratio on initial returns (H2) is
based on the argument that a higher lock-up ratio (LR) reflects or signals higher risk, which must be
compensated with higher returns. In Table 5, although the coefficient of the lock-up ratio is reported to
R. Mohd Rashid et al. / Economic Systems 38 (2014) 487–501 497be positive, the variable is not significant in explaining initial returns. One possible explanation has
been offered by Mohan and Chen (2001), who suggest that a lock-up arrangement which is imposed as
a means of fulfilling a regulatory requirement is more likely to be considered a norm and, therefore,
might not send any signal to the market. However, this suggestion does not explain the significant
relationship between the lock-up period and the initial return established earlier in this study. The
other possible explanation that can be offered at this point is that, unlike the lock-up period, in which
IPO firms strictly commit to the rules stipulated by the market regulator, the lock-up ratio includes an
element of voluntary commitment. A closer look at the sample IPOs reveals that most companies
commit to lock more of their shares than required. To a certain extent, the voluntary element in the
lock-up ratio makes it more difficult for investors to associate a greater lock-up ratio with risk, as it
could also be signaling the quality of the companies. Apparently, as will be shown in Table 7 below, the
risks are indifferent between IPOs with lower and higher lock-up ratios. In short, the lock-up ratio fails
to play any particular role in predicting the initial returns of IPOs.
All the control variables influence initial returns according to the predicted signs. Individually,
consistent with Yong (2011), institutional investor participation (DPRIV) has a significantly negative
coefficient (Table 5), indicating that uninformed investors (non-private placement subscribers) tend
to demand higher initial returns compared to informed investors (private placement subscribers). The
coefficient of the supply of the offer size (LNOFFSZ) is significant and negative with initial returns. As
argued in earlier studies (Abdul-Rahim and Yong, 2010; Jewartowski and Lizińska, 2012; Ghosh,
2005), ceteris paribus, an IPO does not need to be underpriced as deeply to meet the demand of the
primary and secondary markets when its supply is abundant. Meanwhile, the role of the demand
factor (OSR) is positive and significant, indicating that higher demand from investors creates an
upward pressure on prices, which results in higher initial returns for IPOs. This result supports earlier
findings by Abdul-Rahim and Yong (2010), who find a significant positive relationship between initial
returns and demand.
Next, risk (reciprocal of offer price) also reports a significant positive coefficient, implying that the
trade-off hypothesis between risks and returns holds true in the Malaysian IPO market. The finding of
this study suggests that the reciprocal of the offer price as proposed by Bradley and Jordan (2002) can
be interpreted as reflecting the risk of an IPO. Risky firms have greater incentives than good firms to
issue IPOs at lower prices when they need to get sufficient subscriptions from investors. The findings
also support the earlier findings of Jegadeesh et al. (1993) and Willenborg (1999). In an earlier study on
Malaysian IPOs, Abdul-Rahim and Yong (2010) find weak evidence in relation to the reciprocal of the
price. Finally, the market condition during listing (MKTCON) shows a significantly positive coefficient,
suggesting that the market condition is relevant in predicting IPO returns. The finding is consistent
with those of Ritter (1984) and Lee et al., 2011 that initial returns tend to increase during a bullish
market when the market prices and volumes are high.
For robustness, the present study also examines the hypothesized relationships using initial return
of offer-to-close (IRCLOSE) in Table 5. The results are evidently similar to those reported for IROPEN in
terms of the significance and direction of the relationships. One exception is the slightly reduced
explanatory power of the variables, which collectively contribute to a lower goodness-of-fit score for
the IRCLOSE model (adjusted R2 =19%) than for the IROPEN model (adjusted R2 =29%). For more
robustness, the present study re-estimates the models after excluding all IPOs listed in 2008 (Table 6)
to remove the effect of the financial crisis. The results from the IROPEN model show no difference to
those reported from the whole sample (Table 5), with a goodness-of-fit index of 28%. However, the
IRCLOSE model in Table 6 shows that the lock-up ratio is negatively related to IRCLOSE, although it
remains insignificant, as in the whole sample model. Since the IRCLOSE model does not pass the
Ramsey reset test of model specification either, the negative effect is assumed to be driven by trading
noises, such that, in general, it may be surmised that the lock-up ratio does not explain the variations
in initial return.
4.3. Further analysis
To confirm whether the signaling content of lock-up provision in this market reflects the risk or
quality of the IPOs, this study carries out further analysis to examine the characteristics of the
Table 6
Results of regressions of initial return on selected predictor variables, omitting 2008 IPOs.
Variable Predicted sign IROPEN IRCLOSE
Coefficient t-Stats Coefficient t-Stats
C 77.3803 2.4473*** 79.8952 2.01631**
LR Positive .1376 .5973 .0108 .0392
DLP Positive 13.5291 2.6978*** 13.0641 2.2026**
DPRIV Negative 21.6083 4.1953*** 24.5852 3.7729***
LNOFFSZ Negative 4.1724 2.5759*** 3.8922 2.1276**
OSR Positive .3879 4.6457*** .2985 4.9682***
RISK Positive 4.9983 2.1383*** 8.4580 1.7620*
MKTCON Positive 1.7769 3.7052*** 1.4404 2.6113*
Adjusted R2 .2874 .1823
F-statistics 22.1483*** 12.6909***
Durbin–Watson 1.5663 1.7492
VIF range 1.1–1.8 1.1–2.4
RAMSEY reset test, F-Stats 3.2207 4.6568**
Notes: ***, **, and * indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. Autocorrelation problems are corrected using the
Newey–West procedure. VIF—variance inflation factor. The regression excludes data on IPOs listed in 2008 to remove the
influence of financial crisis. The p-value of the F-statistics from the Ramsey test is .03 for the IRCLOSE model. N=368.
Table 7
Profiles of IPO portfolio formed based on lock-up parameters.
Comparison basis Lock-up ratio Lock-up period
Low High Z-score 6 month 1 year Z-score
IROPEN 30.20 22.34 2.04** 10.30 34.67 5.34***
LR 46.95 67.67 13.11*** 60.15 55.28 4.36***
DLP .88 .62 4.37*** .00 1.00 19.57***
PRIV (%) 42.32 41.23 .52 43.64 43.11 .47
OFFSZ (RM mill) 170.86 233.77 2.12** 558.33 36.67 7.37***
OSR 30.49 22.42 1.84* 16.05 34.34 3.56***
RISK 1.69 1.59 .50 1.62 1.70 .31
MKTCON 3.77 3.03 1.91* 6.81 3.53 .01
MKTCAP (RM mill) 442.69 799.30 2.47** 1659.05 129.10 5.912***
Notes: ***, **, and * indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. Sub-samples low—30% of IPOs with lowest lock-up ratio
and high—30% of IPOs with highest lock-up ratio. Sub-samples of lock-up period merely separate IPOs into 1 year or 6 month
lock-up period. Number of IPOs per group (N): NLOW =NHIGH =115, NMONTH =83, N1 year =292. Z-scores are obtained from Mann–
Whitney U tests.
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Specifically, the sample IPOs are segregated into three portfolios based on their respective lock-up
ratios: Low (30% of IPOs with the lowest lock-up ratio); Medium (40% of IPOs with medium lock-up
ratio); and High (30% of IPOs with the highest lock-up ratio). The medium portfolio is merely meant for
creating a clear distinction between the Low and High portfolios. To form portfolios of IPOs based on
the lock-up period, the segregation is done based only on whether the IPO issuers lock up their shares
for 1 year or 6 months. The profiles of the resulting portfolios are reported in Table 7.
From the lock-up ratio segregation, the Low and High portfolios seem to be indifferent in terms of
institutional investor participation and, more surprisingly, risk. The latter finding provides strong
evidence to counter the second hypothesis (H2) forwarded in this study that the lock-up ratio is
supposed to signal risk. As a matter of fact, the portfolio of High lock-up ratio exhibits profiles of lower-
risk companies. While the average risk is only slightly lower than that of the Low portfolio, the High
portfolio is also apparently associated with IPOs that are issued by significantly larger companies
which issue larger IPOs.
In addition, Table 7 also exhibits profiles of large firms which are normally associated with stability
and a longer operating history in the market. It is interesting to note that these companies lock up
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leans towards suggesting that the lock-up ratio is more consistent with quality rather than risk
signaling. Rationally, insiders are less likely to retain (lock up) their shares in the firms unless the
benefits of doing so outweigh the costs. Even though the condition outlined by Courteau (1995) that
quality signaling must be supported with improved demand for the IPO is not met in the portfolios of
the lock-up ratio, this condition prevails when the portfolios are formed based on the length of the
lock-up period.
From the IPO supply and demand standpoint (Bradley et al., 2001), when the locked-up shares are
prohibited from entering the market, the supply of the new shares is restricted and insufficient to meet
the demand from the investors (Miller, 1977). In the case of high quality IPOs, the supply deficit will
create upward pressure on the price of the IPO and, therefore, initial returns. This proposition is not
supported with clear-cut evidence from profiles of portfolios of lock-up ratio. Note that the High
portfolio reports lower investor demand (OSR) and IPO price (and thus initial return) is apparently less
affected, especially because the IPOs are ample in supply (OFFSZ). The evidence, however, prevails
when observed from profiles of the portfolio of the lock-up period. Note that IPOs which are locked up
longer are apparently highly demanded and the high initial returns are foreseeably justified with a
smaller supply of such IPOs. Risk could have been the implication of small-sized IPOs issued by smaller
companies, had the risk difference been economically and statistically justified in this case.
The merit of risk signaling is also questionable in this study because, although the market regulator
(the SC) only imposes lock-up provisions on selected industries, in reality nearly all IPO issuers must
abide by the same listing requirements because most listings are sought through the market
capitalization route. Also, the fact that most companies lock up more of their shares than they are
required to indicates that the firms’ pre-IPO shareholders are in favor of the lock-up provision.
Evidently, as illustrated in Fig. 1, the lock-up ratio has increased to another level when the SC revises
the equity guidelines to impose lock-up on the entire shareholdings of the major shareholders. In
other words, major shareholders could have taken advantage of the revised guidelines to ‘‘exit’’ the
company at the IPO. Instead, they seem to be strengthening their position in the companies by locking
in more of their shares. One could easily infer that such a commitment does not signal risk. Rather, it is
easier to digest the argument that it is the insiders’ (major shareholders) confidence in the future
prospects of the companies that drive their decision to stay rather than to exit. Even though the initial
performance of these IPOs is not as high as those which lock in less, shareholders seem to perceive that
staying in the companies that they are familiar with is a better alternative than taking an exit at the
IPO and reinvesting the capital somewhere else. This supposition is supported based on the
performance of the stock market in general, which is reported to generate an average return that is
barely different from those of riskless securities, like fixed deposits and savings accounts.
With regard to portfolios formed on lock-up periods, the risk for a 1-year portfolio is only slightly
higher, and the difference is apparently insignificant. The interesting findings here are related to the
other profiles, which seem to be lenient toward supporting the quality hypothesis. To recapitulate, the
quality signaling of the lock-up period argument must be supported by the conditions stipulated in
Courteau (1995). He posits that, when lock-up periods are seen as signaling the firm’s quality or better
future prospects, longer lock-up periods should be accompanied by a higher demand for the IPOs,
which subsequently leads to higher initial returns. Note that the results in Table 7 show that the
portfolio of the longer lock-up period is formed from IPOs that exhibit significantly higher investor
demand (OSR) and, consequently, significantly higher initial returns. In a setting characterized with
high information asymmetry like Malaysia, the insiders should have more and better information
about their companies. Therefore, the insiders’ decision to retain their interests in the companies
should be the best indicator that the companies are good for long-term growth in one’s investment.
This line of argument may partially explain the high investor demand and high initial return
associated with IPOs with longer lock-up periods.
5. Conclusion and implications
The present paper examines the issue of lock-up provisions (ratio and period) in IPOs and their
relationship with initial returns using a dataset from Bursa Malaysia spanning the period from January
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2000 to 2012 period is 29%. This average performance can still be considered anomalous, particularly
considering the flaccid market condition during the same period. Although the mean initial return of
the sample IPOs in the present study is lower than the 81% reported for the period of 1991–1995 (Yong
et al., 2001), it is very similar to the 31% found for the period of 1999–2008 (Abdul-Rahim et al., 2012).
The declining trend has been attributed to the SC’s decision to liberalize the IPO pricing mechanism in
1996 and the adverse effect of the 1997/1998 Asian Financial Crisis (Abdul-Rahim and Yong, 2008). A
further drop in the initial return in this study could be conveniently associated with the negative effect
of the Global Crisis in 2007/08, but the same goes for the possible effects of the continuous upgrading
of listing requirements for IPO companies in this market. As illustrated in Fig. 1, after the intense slump
in 2008, the annual average initial returns on IPOs never go far beyond the lowest initial return before
the crisis. Such a persistent declining trend probably reflects that the market regulator’s decision in
promoting transparency in pricing works to effectively improve the efficiency of the Malaysian stock
market. From the investors’ viewpoint, the development can be perceived as good news, since
Malaysia can now be considered a safe yet attractive place to invest capital. For shareholders and
issuing companies, there is now less pressure to leave money on the table for short-term investors,
so that the greater offer size of IPOs can be put into productive activities that eventually benefit the
long-term investors or shareholders.
With regard to the main issue examined in the present study, we recapitulate that lock-up ratios
and lock-up periods are predicted to have a positive influence on the initial returns of IPOs based on
the risk-signaling hypothesis. Several conclusions can be drawn from the findings of the regression
analysis. We find evidence that lock-up provision plays a significant role in explaining the initial
performance of the IPOs. However, such a role is only confined to lock-up periods, and further analysis
of the findings is apparently more inclined toward associating lock-up periods with quality rather than
the risk signaling hypothesis. In the meantime, the role of lock-up ratios in influencing IPO initial
returns is still somewhat preliminary. Even though past studies in developed countries show that
lock-up ratios play a role in explaining IPO returns (Brav and Gompers, 2003), the evidence in the
context of the Malaysian IPO market is weak since the relationship is insignificant but positive, as
expected. This study proposes that this could be due to the voluntary element that is embedded in the
lock-up ratio, but further evidence is needed to draw such a conclusion. Similar to the lock-up period,
quality rather than risk is more likely to be the explanation behind the positive relationship between
the lock-up ratio and initial returns. This is supported by the fact that, in addition to voluntarily
committing to lock in more shares than they are required to, the IPO shareholders also purposely lock
more shares when the SC begins to impose a lock-up provision on their entire shareholdings.
Finally, the regression model employed in the present study only explains approximately 29% of
the variations in the initial returns, implying that additional predictor variables need to be considered
in future research. Among the variables that could potentially help improve the accuracy of the
prediction is the environment of the IPO market, which could be captured in the forms of heuristic
representation, market temperature (hot versus cold), and market liquidity. Similarly, IPO issuer
characteristics should be considered in future studies when examining lock-up provisions, since no
other study has been performed exclusively on lock-up provisions in Malaysia. Future studies which
examine the role of lock-up provisions in determining the long-term performance of IPO companies
are also helpful in validating the quality hypothesis, because the outcome of quality in the form of
higher future cash flows can only prevail after the companies are put into operation. Future studies
which examine the behavior of IPOs issued partially or exclusively through private placement issue
are also warranted given the significant role of DPRIV in explaining initial return and because the
majority (76%) of IPOs in this market are issued through this issue type.
The findings of the present study have important implications for investors as well as market
regulators. They suggest that the mandatory requirement regarding lock-up periods for promoters is
an important factor to consider when making decisions about IPOs, because longer lock-up periods
improve the likelihood of obtaining high returns. For the regulator, the finding implies that a revision
of the lock-up period in the future should be carefully formulated in order to make it an effective
mechanism to protect genuine investors and minority shareholders. The lock-up period should not
only benefit investors in the very short run, but, more importantly, should materialize the objective of
R. Mohd Rashid et al. / Economic Systems 38 (2014) 487–501 501the major shareholders’ commitment in the form of actual long-term returns. The results are also
consistent with the requirements of the market regulators concerning the disclosure of information
about lock-up provisions to investors. Such information needs to be disclosed to ensure that
shareholders are informed about the quality of the issuers before they make a decision about their
investment in the IPOs.
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